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Abstract
The Logic of Approximate Entailment (LAE) is a graded counterpart of classi-
cal propositional calculus, where conclusions that are only approximately correct
can be drawn. This is achieved by equipping the underlying set of possible worlds
with a similarity relation. When using this logic in applications, however, a disad-
vantage must be accepted; namely, in LAE it is not possible to combine conclusions
in a conjunctive way. In order to overcome this drawback, we propose in this paper
a modification of LAE where, at the semantic level, the underlying set of worlds is
moreover endowed with an order structure. The chosen framework is designed in
view of possible applications.
1 Introduction
In his seminal work on similarity-based reasoning [23], E. Ruspini proposes the inter-
pretation of fuzzy sets in terms of (crisp) sets and fuzzy similarity relations. To this
end, he builds up a framework for approximate inference that is based on the mutual
similarity of the propositions involved. Following these lines, a number of approaches
have dealt with similarity-based reasoning from a logical perspective [9, 10, 11, 13];
see also [18, Section 5.2]. In particular, in the PhD thesis of R. Rodrı´guez [22], the
so-called Logic of Approximate Entailment (LAE) is studied.
LAE is a propositional logic and propositions are interpreted, as in classical logic, by
subsets of a fixed set, called the set of worlds. Propositions can be logically combined
like in classical propositional logic and the Boolean connectives are interpreted by
the corresponding set-theoretic operations as usual. However, it is in addition assumed
that the set of worlds is endowed with a fuzzy similarity relation, which associates with
∗Preprint of an article published by Elsevier in the International Journal of Approximate Reason-
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each pair of two worlds their degree of resemblance. The basic semantic structures are
hence fuzzy similarity spaces, which consist of a set of worlds and a fuzzy similarity
relation, and the core syntactic objects of LAE are implications between propositions
endowed with a degree. The intended meaning of a statement of the form α >c β is
that β is an approximate consequence of α to the degree c, where c is a real number
between 0 and 1. If c = 1, the implication is defined to hold under the same condition
as in classical propositional logic: at any world at which α holds, also β must hold. If
c < 1, however, the statement is weaker, namely, we do not require in this case that if α
holds at a world w, also β holds at w, we only require that there is a further world w′ at
which β holds and whose similarity with w is at least c. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Figure 1: The graded entailment in LAE. Let A and B be the sets of worlds
at which α and β hold, respectively. Then α >c β means that A is in the c-
neighbourhood of B. Note that c varies between 0 and 1 and a smaller value of
c corresponds to a greater distance.
Logics dealing with statements that are interpreted in metric spaces have been studied
also from different points of view. Logics for spaces endowed with a metric or a more
general distance function have been considered in a series of contributions by Kutz et
al., see, e.g., [16, 17]. Furthermore, logics on comparative similarity have been studied
by Alenda et al., see, e.g., [1, 2, 3]. It is also worth mentioning that there are some
connections with graded or fuzzy consequence relations as studied by Pavelka [21, 20],
Chakraborty [6, 7], and Gerla [12] among others in the context of many-valued logics,
since indeed, graded implications α >c β capture, at a syntactic (meta-)level, the idea
of β being a consequence of α to the degree c. However, in the present context, α and
β are classical propositions, not many-valued ones.
The starting point for the present paper is the aforementioned logic LAE. Although the
concept underlying this logic is appealing, a disadvantage must be accepted. Deploy-
ing LAE in applications is difficult for a simple reason: in LAE we cannot combine
conclusions in a conjunctive way. Assume that we have α >c β and α >d γ, where
0 < c, d < 1. Then we can not in general derive in LAE a statement of the form
α >e β ∧ γ for some non-zero e. This feature of LAE is a straightforward consequence
of the chosen semantic framework: if α implies that we are close to a situation in which
β holds and moreover close to a situation in which γ holds, we cannot conclude that
we are actually close to a situation in which both β and γ hold. In other words, for
any sets of worlds A, B and C, if A is in the c-neighbourhood of B as well as in the
d-neighbourhood of C, we cannot make any prediction about the value e such that A is
in the e-neighbourhood of B ∩ C. Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration. In the extreme
case, β and γ can even be contradictory. In such a case, there is no world at which both
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β and γ hold and β ∧ γ will be interpreted by the empty set; but the e-neighbourhood
of the empty set is empty for any e.
Figure 2: The conjunction in LAE. If A is in the c-neighbourhood of B as well
as in the d-neighbourhood of C, we cannot make any prediction about the value
e such that A is in the e-neighbourhood of B ∩ C.
The lack of a rule that combines conclusions in a conjunctive way may be found re-
strictive in applications. Let us consider the following example; let the symbols α, β,
γ denote the following properties of a car:
α “power(car) = 110 CV”
β “price(car) > 20 000 AC”
γ “consumption(car) > 6 L/100km”
Assume that our domain knowledge tells us that powerful cars are expensive to some
extent and at the same time they have a high consumption. These facts could be re-
flected by a theory containing the graded implications
α >c β, α >d γ, (1)
where c and d are some appropriate non-zero degrees. It then seems natural to be able
to derive α >e β ∧ γ for some positive degree e.
This situation is certainly not appropriately reflected by Figure 2. The crucial difference
is the independence of the properties β, γ occurring in the conclusions. Price and
consumption can indeed be assumed as not being interrelated. Consequently, a model
can be based on a set of worlds consisting of all pairs of possible prices and possible
consumption. Property α, the power of the car, is in turn assumed to have an influence
on the other two. To reflect this influence, α is to be identified with those pairs of a
price and a consumption that are not in contradiction with it. Assuming, for instance,
that a power of 110 CV implies a price range between 15 000 AC and 30 000 AC as
well as a petrol consumption between 5 L/100km and 9 L/100km, our model would be
the one indicated in Figure 3. Finally, a similarity between worlds can be computed
as an aggregation of the similarities with regard to β and γ, like for instance their
minimum. Under these assumption, we are able to derive from (1) the implication
α >min(a,b) β ∧ γ.
We discuss in this paper extensions of LAE that are tailored to a scenario of this kind.
We shall consider two logics. As a first step, we define the logic LAEC corresponding
to the particular semantics where the sets of worlds in the similarity spaces are totally
ordered. We show that in this case the approximate graded implication >c allows,
under a natural condition, the conjunctive combination of conclusions.
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Figure 3: The conjunction of independent properties, modelled by B and C. If
a set A is in the c-neighbourhood of B and in the d-neighbourhood of C, then
A is also in the e-neighbourhood of B ∩ C, where e is calculated from c and d
according to some aggregation function.
In a second step, we consider the many-sorted logic LAEPC whose semantics is based
on similarity spaces which are Cartesian products of totally ordered ones (i.e. where
the set of worlds is a Cartesian product of chains and the similarity over the product
space is defined as the minimum of the similarities over the components). In this logic,
the components in the product spaces correspond to different sorts in the logic, and
conjunctive combination of conclusions are supported whenever, roughly speaking,
they are of a different sort.
The paper is organised as follows. After this introduction we review in Section 2 the
basic definitions and results of the logic LAE. In Section 3 we present the logic LAEC
for totally ordered similarity spaces, while in Section 4 we introduce the more general
logic LAEPC, which can cope with products of totally ordered similarity spaces. The
final Section 5 contains some conclusions and additional remarks.
2 The Logic of Approximate entailment
The Logic of Approximate Entailment LAE is a propositional logic where propositions
are interpreted by subsets of a fixed set, called the set of worlds. Propositions may
be logically combined like in classical propositional logic; the Boolean connectives
are interpreted by the set-theoretic operations. We will, in addition, assume that the
set of worlds is endowed with a similarity relation. The core syntactic objects are
implications between propositions, endowed with a degree. The intended meaning
of a statement of the form α >c β is that α implies β to the degree c, i.e., β is an
approximate consequence of α to the degree c, where c is a real number between 0 and
1. For c = 1, the implication is the classical one: if α holds at a world w, then so does
β. For c < 1, the statement is weakened as follows: if α holds at a world w, there is a
world w′ at which β holds and the similarity of w′ and w is at least c.
Formally, we specify LAE as follows. We proceed largely in accordance with [11] and
we refer to this paper for further details. The original account is, however, due to [22];
see also [13]. A further, recent approach to the axiomatisation of LAE is contained in
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[25].
We start with a finite number ϕ1, . . . , ϕN of variables. The number N > 1 can be
chosen arbitrarily, but will be fixed. The basic expressions of LAE are built up from the
variables as well as the constants ⊥,> by means of the binary operators ∧ and ∨ and
the unary operator ¬. We denote the set of basic expressions by B.
Furthermore, we choose a subset V of the real unit interval containing 0 and 1. The
elements of V will be used as degrees of approximation. In a finitary setting it is
moreover reasonable to assume that V is finite and this is what we will do in the sequel.
To express transitivity of the approximate entailment relation, we need to endow V
with a binary operation  fulfilling the following conditions:  is associative;  is
commutative; 1 is neutral w.r.t. ; and  is monotone in both arguments. In other
words,  makes V into a finite, integral, commutative totally ordered monoid. In the
present context, is also called a discrete or finite t-norm; see [14, 19], cf. also [8]. We
will assume that the pair (V,) is chosen arbitrarily, but fixed throughout this paper.
A graded implication of LAE is a triple consisting of two basic expressions ϕ and ψ as
well as an element c ∈ V ; we write
ϕ >c ψ.
LAE uses a two-level language and graded implications represent its inner level. At the
outer level, we use the classical connectives to combine graded implications into more
complex expressions. That is, formulas of LAE are built up from graded implications
by means of the binary operators ∧ and ∨ and the unary operator ¬. The additional
(definable) connectives→ and↔will have the usual meaning in classical propositional
logic (CPL for short) and to avoid brackets, these connectives will be given lowest
precedence.
We next specify the semantics of LAE.
Definition 2.1. Let W be a non-empty set. Let S : W 2 → V be such that, for any
u, v, w ∈ W , (i) S(u, v) = 1 if and only if u = v; (ii) S(u, v) = S(v, u); and (iii)
S(u,w) > S(u, v)S(v, w). Then we call (W,S) a similarity space based on (V,).
The similarity space (W,S) is intended to assume the role of a set of worlds W en-
dowed with a similarity relation S that measures the resemblance of worlds. Each
element w ∈ W will give rise to a yes-no assignment of our variables and we will
assume that w is actually uniquely determined by this assignment. Hence our basic
semantic structures will in fact be similarity spaces of finite cardinality.
For some degree c ∈ V and a subset A of a finite similarity space (W,S), we put
Uc(A) = {w ∈W : there is an a ∈ A such that S(w, a) > c}.
Note that then Uc(A) =
⋃
a∈A Uc({a}) and in particular Uc(∅) = ∅.
Definition 2.2. An evaluation for LAE in a finite similarity space (W,S) is a mapping
e : B → P(W ) such that (i) for any ϕ,ψ ∈ B, e(ϕ ∧ ψ) = e(ϕ) ∩ e(ψ), e(ϕ ∨ ψ) =
e(ϕ) ∪ e(ψ), e(¬ϕ) = W \ e(ϕ), e(⊥) = ∅, and e(>) = W and (ii) for any distinct
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elements v, w ∈ W there is a variable ϕ such that e(ϕ) contains exactly one of v and
w.
Moreover, the evaluation e in (W,S) is said to satisfy a graded implication ϕ >c ψ,
written (W,S, e) |= ϕ >c ψ, if
e(ϕ) ⊆ Uc(e(ψ));
the satisfaction of the remaining formulas of LAE is defined in accordance with classi-
cal propositional logic.
Finally, a theory of LAE is a set of formulas. We say that a theory T semantically
entails a formula Φ, written T |=LAE Φ, if the following holds: for any finite similarity
space (W,S) and any evaluation e in (W,S), if (W,S, e) |= Ψ for all Ψ ∈ T , then
(W,S, e) |= Φ.
We have defined LAE on a semantic basis; we now turn to its axiomatisation. We will
need an additional syntactic concept. By a literal, we mean a variable or a negated
variable. A maximally elementary conjunction, or m.e.c. for short, is a conjunction of
literals in which each variable of LAE occurs exactly once. We note that these formulas
are also known in the literature as min-terms.
Definition 2.3. The following are axioms of LAE, for any ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ B and c, d ∈ V :
(A1) ϕ >1 ψ, where ϕ,ψ are such that ϕ→ ψ is a tautology of CPL
(A2) (ϕ >1 ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ >1 ⊥)
(A3) (ϕ >c ψ)→ (ϕ >d ψ), where d 6 c
(A4) ¬(ψ >1 ⊥)→ (ϕ >0 ψ)
(A5) (ϕ >c ⊥)→ (ϕ >1 ⊥)
(A6) ¬(δ >1 ⊥) ∧ (δ >c ε) → (ε >c δ), where δ and ε are m.e.c.’s
(A7) (ϕ >c χ) ∧ (ψ >c χ) → (ϕ ∨ ψ >c χ)
(A8) (ε >c ϕ ∨ ψ) → (ε >c ϕ) ∨ (ε >c ψ), where ε is a m.e.c.
(A9) (ϕ >c ψ) ∧ (ψ >d χ)→ (ϕ >cd χ)
(A10) ¬(> >1 ⊥)
(A11) For any tautology of CPL, the formula resulting from a uniform replacement
of the variables by graded implications.
Finally, modus ponens is the only rule of LAE: for any formulas Φ,Ψ
(MP)
Φ Φ→ Ψ
Ψ
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A proof of a formula Φ from a theory T is defined as usual. If it exists, we write
T `LAE Φ.
A theory T is called consistent if T does not prove > >1 ⊥.
Let us shortly comment on the axioms (A1)–(A10) of LAE. Basic expressions are
interpreted by subsets of a similarity space and >1 corresponds to the subsethood re-
lation; thus the meaning of (A1) and (A2) is clear. Recall furthermore that, in gen-
eral, >c expresses that a set is contained in the c-neighbourhood of another set. A
c-neighbourhood is contained in a d-neighbourhood if d 6 c; hence also (A3) is justi-
fied. (A4) says that the 0-neighbourhood of a non-empty set is the whole set of worlds.
(A5) in turn expresses that the c-neighbourhood of the empty set is the empty set for
whatever value c.
Next note that, by part (ii) of the definition of an evaluation, the set interpreting a m.e.c.
contains at most one element. Accordingly, (A6) means that if a singleton is in the c-
neighbourhood of another singleton, then also the converse holds. (A7) expresses that
if two sets are in the c-neighbourhood of a further set, then so is its union. And (A8)
says that if an element is in the c-neighbourhood of the union of sets, then it is already
in the c-neighbourhood of one of these sets.
(A9) is the transitivity for the neighbourhood relations. Finally, (A10) asserts that the
set of worlds is not empty. Note that, due to axiom (A10), consistency in LAE is
equivalent to consistency in the sense of classical propositional logic.
Let us moreover remark that LAE satisfies the rule of substitution of classical equiv-
alents. Indeed, if α ↔ α′ and β ↔ β′ are tautologies of CPL, then (α >c β) ↔
(α′ >c β′). For, we conclude by (A1) that α′ >1 α and β >1 β′ and hence, by (A9),
(α >c β)→ (α′ >c β′). Similarly we argue for the converse direction.
We have the following soundness and completeness theorem for LAE. We include a
proof that is just detailed enough to serve as a reference in the subsequent sections; for
full details, we refer to [11].
Theorem 2.4. Let T be a theory and Φ be a formula of LAE. Then T `LAE Φ if and
only if T |=LAE Φ.
Proof. The “only if” part follows from the soundness of the axioms (A1)–(A10), which
is easily checked; cf. the explanations after Definition 2.3.
To show the “if” part, assume that T does not prove Φ. Extending T if necessary, we
can w.l.o.g. assume that T is complete, that is, T `LAE Ψ or T `LAE ¬Ψ for each
formula Ψ.
For ϕ,ψ ∈ B, let ϕ 4 ψ if T ` ϕ >1 ψ. Let ≈ be the symmetrisation of 4, that is, let
ϕ ≈ ψ if ϕ 4 ψ and ψ 4 ϕ. We conclude from (A1) and (A2) that≈ is an equivalence
relation and in fact a congruence with respect to ∧, ∨, and ¬. We denote the ≈-class
of some ϕ ∈ B by 〈ϕ〉≈. Let L = {〈ϕ〉≈ : ϕ ∈ B}; then L, endowed with the induced
operations ∧, ∨, ¬ as well as the constants 〈⊥〉≈, 〈>〉≈, is a Boolean algebra.
As there are only finitely many variables, B and consequently also L are finite. Fur-
thermore, any ϕ ∈ B is the supremum of m.e.c.s and hence the atoms of L are 〈ε〉≈,
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where ε is a m.e.c. such that T 0 ε >1 ⊥. Let W be the set of atoms of L, and for
ϕ ∈ B, let
e(ϕ) = {〈ε〉≈ ∈W : ε 4 ϕ}. (2)
Then e : B → P(W ) is an evaluation for LAE.
For 〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈ ∈W , we define
S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) = max {c ∈ V : T ` δ >c ε}; (3)
note that, due to the finiteness of V , the maximum always exists. By (A1), (A6)
and (A9), respectively, S is reflexive, symmetric and -transitive. Furthermore, if
S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) = 1, then T ` δ >1 ε; this means that T ` ε >1 δ holds as well,
hence δ ≈ ε. We conclude that S is a similarity relation. Moreover, we have, for any
ϕ,ψ ∈ B,
T ` ϕ >c ψ iff e(ϕ) ⊆ Uc(e(ψ)). (4)
Indeed, the case that ϕ ≈ ⊥ or ψ ≈ ⊥ or c = 0 is covered by (A1), (A4), and
(A5). Otherwise, we have by (A1), (A3), (A7), (A8), and the completeness of T that
T ` ϕ >c ψ iff T `
∨
δ4ϕ δ >c
∨
ε4ψ ε, where δ and ε are meant to refer to m.e.c.’s.
Now the latter holds iff for any δ 4 ϕ there is an ε 4 ψ such that T ` δ >c ε, and this
holds iff for any 〈δ〉≈ ∈ e(ϕ) there is an 〈ε〉≈ ∈ e(ψ) such that S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) > c,
and finally this holds iff e(ϕ) ⊆ Uc(e(ψ)).
It follows that e satisfies all elements of T , but not Φ. That is, T does not semantically
entail Φ.
3 Approximate Entailment on a Chain
The Logic of Approximate Entailment LAE, which we have defined in the previous
section, might be appealing because of its transparency and simplicity. However, we
should admit that the practical usability of LAE is limited. Roughly speaking, we may
observe that LAE is well-behaved as regards the logical disjunction, but poorly behaved
as regards the logical conjunction. In LAE, like in classical propositional logic, we can
indeed derive from ϕ >c χ and ψ >c χ that ϕ ∨ ψ >c χ, and vice versa. In contrast,
assume that we have ϕ >c χ and ϕ >c ψ, a probably even more common situation. In
general, there is no way to derive in LAE from these statements alone that ϕ >d χ ∧ ψ
such that d > 0. The only exception is the case c = 1, which allows classical reasoning.
To respond to this weakness, we consider in this subsection a more special framework.
We assume that we proceed in accordance with typical applications. Indeed, configura-
tions are often described by parameters and distinctions are often made by the reference
to a totally ordered structure. In this paper, we consider two variants of LAE that are
based on exactly this assumption.
In our first step, which is the topic of this section, we will assume that our set of worlds
is equipped with a total order, so they form a chain. We will extend our language so as
to be able to refer to the total order. In a subsequent step, discussed in Section 4, we
will go further and work with a direct product of chains.
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In order to be able to refer to a total order, we will use two modal operators, denoted by
♦6 and ♦>. Disregarding the similarity relation, our new calculus is closely related to
the modal logic S4.3; see, e.g., [15]. Our notation is chosen accordingly; the particular
symbol ♦6 is borrowed from [4]. S4.3 can be viewed as the logic of total preorders,
where in a Kripke model a proposition ♦ϕ is interpreted by the set consisting of the
worlds at which ϕ holds as well as those that are below them according to the given
preorder. Replacing “preorder” with “order”, this is exactly the way we will interpret
♦6. In addition, we add the operator ♦>, which will be interpreted in a dual way.
Let us now formally specify the Logic for Approximate Entailment on a Chain, or
LAEC for short. We fix again a finite number of variables ϕ1, . . . , ϕN . The basic
expressions of LAEC are built up from the variables and the constants ⊥,> by means
of the Boolean connectives and the two unary operators ♦6 and ♦>. To denote the set
of basic expressions of LAEC, we use again the symbol B. A basic expression of the
form ♦>ϕ or ♦6ϕ for some ϕ ∈ B will be called a diamond expression. Similarly to the
case of LAE, graded implications of LAEC are expressions of the form ϕ >c ψ, where
ϕ,ψ ∈ B, and formulas of LAEC are Boolean combinations of graded implications.
On the semantic side, our basic models will include a total order.
Definition 3.1. We call a triple (W,S,6) a totally ordered similarity space if: (i)
(W,S) is a finite similarity space based on (V,), and (ii) 6 is a total order on W
such that, for u, v, w ∈W , u 6 v 6 w implies min(S(u, v), S(v, w)) > S(u,w).
Note that condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 requires the similarity relation S in a totally
ordered similarity space (W,S,6) to be compatible with the underlying ordering6 in a
natural sense: proceeding from some element u along the chain upwards or downwards,
the similarity with u becomes successively smaller.
In order to define the interpretation of the two new unary operators of LAEC, let us
make the following definitions. Let (W,S,6) be a totally ordered similarity space and
let A ⊆W be a subset of worlds; then we put:
♦6A = {v ∈W : there is a w ∈ A such that v 6 w},
♦>A = {v ∈W : there is a w ∈ A such that v > w}.
(5)
In a finite chain (W ;6), given two elements u, v ∈W such that u 6 v, we call a set of
the form [u, v] = {w ∈ W : u 6 w 6 v} an interval of W . If u is the bottom element
of W , we also write (−∞, v]; if v is the top element, we also write [u,∞). Note that,
for any non-empty A ⊆W , we have
♦6A = (−∞,maxA],
♦>A = [minA,∞).
Therefore, ♦6A and ♦>A are intervals in W . Trivially, the intersection of intervals is
either empty or an interval as well. Note that, in particular, ♦6A ∩ ♦>A is the smallest
interval containing A.
The following lemma compiles some obvious properties of the operators (5).
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Lemma 3.2. Let (W,S,6) be a totally ordered similarity space. Then we have, for
any A,B ⊆W and c ∈ V :
(i) A ⊆ ♦6A.
(ii) ♦6♦6A = ♦6A.
(iii) ♦6∅ = ∅.
(iv) At least one of ♦6A ⊆ ♦6B or ♦6B ⊆ ♦6A holds.
(v) If A ⊆ Uc(B), then ♦6A ⊆ Uc♦6B.
In particular, A ⊆ B implies ♦6A ⊆ ♦6B.
In addition, each statement (i)–(v) still holds when we replace all symbols “♦6” by
“♦>”.
Moreover, we have for all A,B ⊆W :
(vi) For any w ∈W , ♦6{w} ∩ ♦>{w} = {w}.
(vii) A ∩ ♦6B = ∅ implies ♦>A ∩ ♦6B = ∅. Similarly, A ∩ ♦>B = ∅ implies
♦6A ∩ ♦>B = ∅.
One more statement concerns our very motivation to define the logic LAEC: the be-
haviour of the approximate implication >c with respect to conjunction.
Lemma 3.3. Let (W,S,6) be a totally ordered similarity space. For intervals A and
B of W with a non-empty intersection and for any c ∈ V , we have
Uc(A ∩B) = Uc(A) ∩ Uc(B).
Finally, we can define the evaluations in LAEC.
Definition 3.4. An evaluation e for LAEC in a totally ordered similarity space (W,S,
6) is defined as in case of LAE; in addition, we require, for any basic expression ϕ,
that e(♦6ϕ) = ♦6e(ϕ) and e(♦>ϕ) = ♦>e(ϕ).1
Moreover, the notions of satisfaction and semantic entailment are defined analogously
to the case of LAE. We write (W,S,6, e) |= Φ to denote that an evaluation e in
(W,S,6) satisfies an LAEC formula Φ, and T |=LAEC Φ to denote that a theory T
semantically entails Φ in LAEC.
We now turn to the axiomatisation of LAEC. Note that we may indeed observe a close
relationship of LAEC with the modal logic S4.3. Recall that S4.3 is the extension of
the basic modal logic K by the axioms T , 4 and H . Our axioms (A12), (A13) are
analogues of the modal axioms T and 4, respectively, and (A15) is related to axiom H ,
as we will see later.
1Note that we use the same symbols ♦6 and ♦> for both the syntactic and semantic operators, but it will
be clear from the context when we refer to one or the other.
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Definition 3.5. The axioms of LAEC are the following ones, for any basic expressions
of LAEC ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ B and any c ∈ V :
(A1’) ϕ >1 ψ, where, for formulas ϕ′, ψ′ of CPL, ϕ′ → ψ′ is a tautology of CPL
and ϕ,ψ arise, respectively, from ϕ′ and ψ′ by a uniform replacement of the
variables occurring in ϕ′ or ψ′ by basic expressions of LAEC;
axioms (A2)–(A11);
(A12a) ϕ >1 ♦6ϕ
(A13a) ♦6♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ϕ
(A14a) ♦6⊥ >1 ⊥
(A15a) (♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ψ) ∨ (♦6ψ >1 ♦6ϕ)
(A12b) ϕ >1 ♦>ϕ
(A13b) ♦>♦>ϕ >1 ♦>ϕ
(A14b) ♦>⊥ >1 ⊥
(A15b) (♦>ϕ >1 ♦>ψ) ∨ (♦>ψ >1 ♦>ϕ)
(A16) ♦6ε ∧ ♦>ε >1 ε, where ε is a m.e.c.
(A17a) (ϕ >c ψ)→ (♦6ϕ >c ♦6ψ)
(A18a) (ϕ ∧ ♦6ψ >1 ⊥)
→ (♦>ϕ ∧ ♦6ψ >1 ⊥)
(A17b) (ϕ >c ψ)→ (♦>ϕ >c ♦>ψ)
(A18b) (ϕ ∧ ♦>ψ >1 ⊥)
→ (♦6ϕ ∧ ♦>ψ >1 ⊥)
(A19) ¬(% ∧ σ >1 ⊥) ∧ (ϕ >c %) ∧ (ϕ >c σ)→ (ϕ >c % ∧ σ),
where %, σ are conjunctions of diamond expressions.
Moreover, the only rule of LAEC is (MP).
Note that the last axiom (A19) literally captures the above mentioned conjunctive prop-
erty of the >c relations. Indeed, a conjunction of diamond expressions is interpreted
by an interval. Hence (A19) says that if two non-contradictory properties % and σ that
correspond to intervals follow from the same premise ϕ to the degree c, then their
conjunction % ∧ σ follows from ϕ to the same degree c. Due to Lemma 3.3, (A19) is
obviously sound.
Lemma 3.6. In LAEC, we can derive, for any basic expressions ϕ and ψ,
♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ) >1 ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ and ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ >1 ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ), (6)
and similarly
♦>(ϕ ∨ ψ) >1 ♦>ϕ ∨ ♦>ψ. and ♦>ϕ ∨ ♦>ψ >1 ♦>(ϕ ∨ ψ).
Proof. We only show the first half of the lemma; the second one is seen analogously.
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From ϕ >1 ♦6ϕ and ψ >1 ♦6ψ, we get ϕ ∨ ψ >1 ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ. By (A15a), we have
(♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ψ) ∨ (♦6ψ >1 ♦6ϕ). Now we reason by cases. From ♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ψ, by
(A12a) we conclude ϕ ∨ ψ >1 ♦6ψ and by (A17a) and (A13a) ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ) >1 ♦6ψ
and hence ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ) >1 ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ. Similarly, from ♦6ψ >1 ♦6ϕ we conclude that
♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ) >1 ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ as well. Therefore, the first part of (6) follows.
Since ϕ→ ϕ∨ψ is a tautology of CPL, we derive ϕ >1 ϕ∨ψ by (A1), and by (A17a)
it follows ♦6ϕ >1 ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ). We argue similarly to derive ♦6ψ >1 ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ) and
thus by propositional reasoning we have ♦6ϕ ∨ ♦6ψ >1 ♦6(ϕ ∨ ψ). Therefore, also
the second part of (6) holds.
Theorem 3.7. Let T be a theory and Φ be a formula of LAEC. Then T `LAEC Φ if and
only if T |=LAEC Φ.
Proof. As regards the “only if” part, the soundness of (A1)–(A10) follows from The-
orem 2.4. The soundness of (A12)–(A18) follows from Lemma 3.2. The soundness of
(A19) holds by Lemma 3.3.
To see the “if” part, assume that T does not prove Φ. Extending T if necessary, we can
assume that the theory T is complete.
We write ϕ 4 ψ for T ` ϕ >1 ψ, we let ≈ be the symmetrisation of 4, and we
proceed like in the proof of Theorem 2.4 to construct the Boolean algebra L of ≈-
classes. Furthermore, by (A17) also ♦6 and ♦> are compatible with ≈; hence we can
define ♦6〈ϕ〉≈ = 〈♦6ϕ〉≈ and ♦>〈ϕ〉≈ = 〈♦>ϕ〉≈ for any 〈ϕ〉≈ ∈ L.
Let W again be the set consisting of the classes 〈ε〉≈, where ε is a m.e.c. such that
T 0 ε >1 ⊥. Then the infimum of two distinct elements of W is 〈⊥〉≈ and the
supremum of all elements of W is 〈>〉≈.
We claim that, for any m.e.c. 〈ε〉≈ ∈ W , 〈♦6ε〉≈ is a supremum of elements of W .
Indeed, let δ be a further m.e.c.; the claim will follow from the fact that either δ 4 ♦6ε
or δ ∧ ♦6ε ≈ ⊥. If δ and ε coincide, the first case applies because of (A12). Let δ and
ε be distinct. By (A15), one of the following two possibilities applies:
Case 1. ♦>δ 4 ♦>ε. Then δ ∧ ♦6ε ≈ δ ∧ ♦>δ ∧ ♦6ε 4 δ ∧ ♦>ε ∧ ♦6ε ≈ δ ∧ ε ≈ ⊥
by (A12) and (A16).
Case 2. ♦>ε 4 ♦>δ. In this case, if we furthermore have that ♦6ε 4 ♦6δ, it follows
ε ≈ ♦6ε ∧ ♦>ε 4 ♦6δ ∧ ♦>δ ≈ δ by (A16), in contradiction to our assumption that δ
and ε are distinct. Hence, by (A15), we have ♦6δ 4 ♦6ε and thus, by (A12), δ 4 ♦6ε.
By Lemma 3.6, it further follows that, for any basic expression ϕ in which ♦6 and ♦>
does not occur, 〈♦6ϕ〉≈ is a supremum of elements of W . We may argue similarly to
conclude that the same applies to 〈♦>ϕ〉≈. Hence W is the set of atoms of L.
We next define e : B → P(W ) by (2). Then e preserves the Boolean operations and
constants. Furthermore, we define S : W 2 → V as in (3), that is, S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) =
max{c ∈ V | T ` δ >c ε}. We conclude as in the proof of Theorem 2.4 that (W,S) is
a finite similarity space such that (4) holds.
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For 〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈ ∈W , let
〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈ if ♦6δ 4 ♦6ε.
Note that, by (A15) and (A16), 〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈ iff ♦>ε 4 ♦>δ. We claim that 6 totally
orders W . Indeed, reflexivity is clear; antisymmetry holds by (A16); and transitivity is
evident as well. Finally, the linearity of 6 holds by (A15).
Let 〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈, 〈ζ〉≈ ∈ W such that 〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈ 6 〈ζ〉≈ and assume T ` δ >c ζ.
Then we have T ` ♦>ε >1 ♦>δ and, by (A17), T ` ♦>δ >c ♦>ζ; hence T ` ♦>ε >c
♦>ζ as well. We also have that T proves ♦6ε >1 ♦6ζ, and hence ♦6ε∧♦>ε >c ♦>ζ as
well as ♦6ε∧♦>ε >c ♦6ζ. Furthermore, by (A16), ♦6ζ ∧♦>ζ ≈ ζ and by assumption
T 0 ζ >1 ⊥; hence, by the completeness of T , T ` ¬(♦6ζ∧♦>ζ >1 ⊥). We conclude
by (A19) that T ` ♦6ε ∧ ♦>ε >c ♦6ζ ∧ ♦>ζ and, by (A16), T ` ε >c ζ. It follows
that S(〈ε〉≈, 〈ζ〉≈) > S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ζ〉≈).
Similarly, we proceed to derive also S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) > S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ζ〉≈). Thus, we have
shown that (W,S,6) is a totally ordered similarity space.
It remains to show that e preserves the modal operations; it will then follow that e
is an evaluation for LAEC. For 〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈ ∈ W , we have δ 4 ♦6ε if and only if
♦6δ 4 ♦6ε if and only if 〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈. That is, ♦6ε is the supremum of all δ such that
〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈. It follows that, for any 〈ϕ〉≈ ∈ L,
♦6〈ϕ〉≈ = 〈♦6ϕ〉≈
=
∨
{〈♦6ε〉≈ : 〈ε〉≈ ∈W such that ε 4 ϕ}
=
∨
{〈δ〉≈ ∈W : 〈δ〉≈ 6 〈ε〉≈ for some 〈ε〉≈ ∈W such that ε 4 ϕ},
and a similar statement holds for ♦>ϕ.
We summarise that e is an evaluation, which, by (4), satisfies the elements of T but not
Φ.
Remark 3.8. We have enlarged the logic LAE by a pair of two modal operators, ♦6
and ♦>. We may say that they are order-theoretic duals of each other. We note that
we could build a logic like LAEC also on the basis of one of these operations, say ♦>,
alone. Indeed, formulas of the form ♦>α∧¬♦>β are suitable to represent the intervals
of the totally ordered set of worlds.
This approach, however, would differ from the present one to a larger extent than one
might expect. Eliminating ♦6 would be easy if we could express ♦6α by a formula
containing ♦> only; there seems to be no straightforward way of doing so.
Remark 3.9. The modal logic S4.3 is the logic of totally preordered frames; see, e.g.,
[5]. We have already mentioned its close relationship to LAEC. We can actually say
that LAEC is stronger than S4.3. Indeed, let us identify the basic expression of LAEC
not containing ♦> (or alternatively, not containing ♦6), with the S4.3 formulas. We
claim that, for each S4.3 tautology α, > >1 α is provable in LAEC.
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Clearly, for any tautology α of CPL, LAEC proves > >1 α by (A1’). Furthermore, in
LAEC, > >1 α → β and α >1 β are mutually derivable; hence from > >1 α and
> >1 α→ β, LAEC proves > >1 β by (A9).
Moreover, S4.3 can be axiomatised by the modal axioms K, T , 4, and H as well as
the rule of necessitation. The claim follows for axiom K from Lemma 3.6 and for the
axioms T and 4 from (A12) and (A13), respectively. Furthermore, assume that LAEC
proves > >1 α. It then follows ¬α >1 ⊥, hence, by (A17), ♦6¬α >1 ♦6⊥, and, by
(A14), ♦6¬α >1 ⊥. We conclude > >1 ¬♦6¬α, that is, LAEC emulates the rule of
necessitation.
It remains to consider the axiom H , which we can express using the ♦6 operator in the
following way:
¬♦6(ϕ ∧ ¬♦6ψ) ∨ ¬♦6(ψ ∧ ¬♦6ϕ).
There is the following corresponding LAEC proof. Assume ♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ψ. Then ϕ >1
♦6ψ by (A12) andϕ∧¬♦6ψ >1 ⊥ by (A2). We conclude♦6(ϕ∧¬♦6ψ) >1 ⊥ by (A17)
and (A14) and hence > >1 ¬♦6(ϕ ∧ ¬♦6ψ). Thus LAEC proves (♦6ϕ >1 ♦6ψ) →
(> >1 ¬♦6(ϕ ∧ ¬♦6ψ)). Similarly, (♦6ψ >1 ♦6ϕ) → (> >1 ¬♦6(ψ ∧ ¬♦6ϕ)) and
thus, by (A15), (> >1 ¬♦6(ϕ ∧ ¬♦6ψ)) ∨ (> >1 ¬♦6(ψ ∧ ¬♦6ϕ)). Hence we finally
have > >1 ¬♦6(ϕ ∧ ¬♦6ψ) ∨ ¬♦6(ψ ∧ ¬♦6ϕ)), as desired.
4 Approximate Entailment on Products of Chains
The logic LAEC, which we have presented in the previous section, is designed for the
case that the universe of discourse is endowed with a total order and that this order
is, in a natural sense, compatible with the similarity relation. LAEC is meant as a
preparation of what we actually have in mind. In the present section, we consider the
case that is more likely to occur in practice; we assume that the universe of discourse
arises from the distinction with respect to several parameters, each of which refers to a
totally ordered structure. That is, we will assume that the set of worlds is, not a chain
but, a product of chains. We will use variables that refer to only one of these total
orders; accordingly, we will deal with variables of different sorts.
We define the Logic for Approximate Entailment on Products of Chains, or LAEPC
for short, as follows. This time, our set of variables will be partitioned as follows. We
fix a number M > 1 and for each i = 1, . . . ,M , we fix a finite number of variables
ϕi1, . . . , ϕiNi . We will say that the variable ϕij belongs to the sort i. Moreover, the
truth constants ⊥ and > are considered to belong to every sort. Finally, we use an
additional finite set ψ1, . . . , ψN of variables that are not bound to be of a particular
sort. We call the former variables sorted and the latter unsorted.2
Basic expressions of LAEPC as well as graded implications and formulas are defined
as in case of LAEC. We will keep using B to denote the set of basic expressions of
2Actually, we will use the unsorted variables as a sort of syntactic sugar, in the sense that they will not
play an active role in determining the possible worlds, but will be governed by the (truth-value of the) sorted
ones. This will be reflected by axiom (A22) below.
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LAEPC. A basic expression ϕ all of whose variables belong to the sort i will itself be
said to belong to the sort i. We also say in this case that ϕ is one-sorted.
By a m.e.c. we mean now a conjunction of literals in which all sorted variables occur
exactly once. Moreover, by a one-sorted m.e.c., we shall mean a conjunction of literals
in which all the variables of a sort i occur exactly once. Finally, we say that two basic
expressions ϕ and ψ are disjoint-sorted if all variables occurring in ϕ and ψ are sorted
and no variable occurring in ϕ is of the same sort as a variable occurring in ψ.
The models for the new logic are defined in the following way.
Definition 4.1. For each i = 1, . . . ,M , let (Wi, Si,vi) be a totally ordered similarity
space based on (V,). Let W = ∏iWi. For each v = (v1, . . . , vM ) and w =
(w1, . . . , wM ) in W , let
S(v, w) = min
16i6M
Si(vi, wi). (7)
Furthermore, for each i, we define the preorder 6i on W as follows:
(v1, . . . , vM ) 6i (w1, . . . , wM ) if vi vi wi. (8)
Then (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) is called a component-wise ordered similarity space.
It is easily verified that, if (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) is a component-wise ordered similarity
space, then (W,S) is a finite similarity space.
We will interpret the modal operations of LAEC in the following way. Let the compo-
nent-wise ordered similarity space (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) be given. For a subset A ⊆
W , we define
♦6A = {w ∈W : for each i, there is a v ∈ A such that w 6i v},
♦>A = {w ∈W : for each i, there is a v ∈ A such that w >i v}.
(9)
Let ♦>i and ♦
6
i , for each i = 1, . . . ,M , be the modal operations for the totally ordered
similarity space (Wi, Si,vi), defined according to (5). Then the modal operations on
W , ♦6 and ♦>, are determined by the operations ♦>i and ♦
6
i in the following sense. Let
us write, for some C ⊆Wi,
piC = {(w1, . . . , wM ) ∈W : wi ∈ C}.
That is, piC may be viewed as a cylindrical extension of C into W . ♦6 applied to a set
of this form is determined by ♦6i . Indeed, for C ⊆Wi, we have
♦6piC = pi(♦6iC).
Furthermore, let A be an arbitrary non-empty subset of W . Then
♦6A =
⋂
i
{pi(♦6i {wi}) : wi ∈Wi such that A ⊆ pi(♦6i {wi})}. (10)
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To improve the expression on the right side, for each i, let xi be w.r.t. vi the largest
element of Wi such that pi{xi} has a non-empty intersection with A. Then ♦6A ⊆
pi♦6{xi} and in fact we have
♦6A =
⋂
i
pi(♦6i {xi}). (11)
Similar statements hold for ♦>. An illustration can be found in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Illustration of the meaning of the modal operator ♦6.
Based on Definition 4.1, let us now define the notion of satisfaction for LAEPC.
Definition 4.2. Let (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) be a component-wise ordered similarity space.
An evaluation for LAEPC in (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) is a mapping e : B → P(W ), subject
to the same conditions as in case of LAE and to the following two additional conditions:
(i) for any variable ϕ of sort i, e(ϕ) = piA for some A ⊆Wi;
(ii) for any unsorted variable α, e(α) is a union of intersections of sets of the form
e(ϕ) or W \ e(ϕ), where ϕ is a variable of any sort;
(iii) for an arbitrary basic expression ϕ, we require
e(♦6ϕ) = ♦6e(ϕ),
e(♦>ϕ) = ♦>e(ϕ).
Moreover, the notions of satisfaction and semantic entailment are defined analogously
to the case of LAEC. We write (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M , e) |= Φ to denote that an evalu-
ation e in (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) satisfies an LAEPC formula Φ, and T |=LAEPC Φ to
denote that a theory T semantically entails Φ in LAEPC.
We see that Definition 4.2 generalises Definition 3.4: when restricting the variables to
a single sort i, the semantic entailment in LAEPC resembles the case of LAEC. Note
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furthermore the effect of part (ii) of Definition 4.2. An unsorted variable α is, by
definition, not bound to a particular sort. It is, however, required that α is interpreted in
the same way as some Boolean combination of sorted variables. Thus α is interpreted
like a disjunction of m.e.c.s, that is, by a disjunction of conjunctions of sorted variables
or their negation.
Again, we compile some basic properties of the operators (9). With reference to the
notation of (9), we will write for any A ⊆ Wi1 × . . . ×Wik , where 1 6 i1 < . . . <
ik 6M ,
piA = {(w1, . . . , wM ) ∈W : (wi1 , . . . , wik) ∈ A}.
Lemma 4.3. Let (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) be a component-wise ordered similarity space.
Then, for any A,B ⊆W and c ∈ V , the following holds:
(i) A ⊆ ♦6A.
(ii) ♦6♦6A = ♦6A.
(iii) ♦6∅ = ∅.
(iv) If A ⊆ Uc(B), then ♦6A ⊆ Uc♦6B.
In particular, A ⊆ B implies ♦6A ⊆ ♦6B.
In addition, each statement (i)–(iv) still holds when we replace all symbols “♦6” by
“♦>”.
Moreover, let 1 6 i1 < . . . < ik 6 M and 1 6 j1 < . . . < jl 6 M such that
{i1, . . . , ik} and {j1, . . . , jl} are disjoint. Then we have:
(v) Let A,C ⊆ Wi1 × . . . × Wik and B,D ⊆ Wj1 × . . . × Wjl . Assume that
A,B,C,D are non-empty. Then piA ⊆ Uc(piC) and piB ⊆ Uc(piD) if and only
if pi(A×B) ⊆ Uc(pi(C ×D)).
(vi) Let A ⊆ W and let B ⊆ Wi1 × . . . ×Wik and C ⊆ Wj1 × . . . ×Wjl . Then
♦6A∩ piB ∩ piC = ∅ if and only if ♦6A∩ piB = ∅ or ♦6A∩ piC = ∅. A similar
statement holds for “♦>” replacing “♦6”.
Finally, we have:
(vii) LetA ⊆Wi for some i and letB ⊆W . If piA∩♦6B = ∅, then ♦>(piA)∩♦6B =
∅. Similarly, if piA ∩ ♦>B = ∅, then ♦6(piA) ∩ ♦>B = ∅.
Proof. (i) and (iii) follow easily from the definition (9).
(ii) follows from (11).
(iv) Let A,B ⊆W such that A ⊆ Uc(B). We have to show that ♦6A ⊆ Uc(♦6B).
For each i = 1, . . . ,M , let aii ∈ Wi be the largest element w.r.t. vi such that there is
an ai = (ai1, . . . , aii, . . . , aiM ) ∈ A; cf. (11). Then ♦6A = {(w1, . . . , wM ) : wi vi
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aii for all i}. Furthermore, by assumption, there is, for each i, a bi = (bi1, . . . , biM ) ∈
B such that S(ai, bi) > c. Then (b11, . . . , bMM ) ∈ ♦6B. Furthermore, because
Si(aii, bii) > c for each i, we have S((a11, . . . , aMM ), (b11, . . . , bMM )) > c and
hence (a11, . . . , aMM ) ∈ Uc(♦6B). The claim follows.
(v) Note first that piA ⊆ Uc(piC) holds if and only if, for any (vi1 , . . . , vik) ∈ A there
is a (wi1 , . . . , wik) ∈ C such that Sip(vip , wip) > c for all p = 1, . . . , k.
We conclude that piA ⊆ Uc(piC) and piB ⊆ Uc(piD) if and only if, for any (vi1 , . . . ,
vik) ∈ A and (vj1 , . . . , ujl) ∈ B, there is a (wi1 , . . . , wik) ∈ C and a (wj1 , . . . , wkl) ∈
D such that Sip(vip , wip) > c for all p = 1, . . . , k and Sjq (vjq , wjq ) > c for all
q = 1, . . . , l. Provided that the considered sets are all non-empty, the latter statement
is obviously equivalent to pi(A×B) ⊆ Uc(pi(C ×D)).
(vi) From A ⊆ W , let e1 ∈ W1, . . . , eM ∈ WM be defined like in (11). Then
♦6A ∩ piB 6= ∅ holds if and only if there is a (vi1 , . . . , vik) ∈ B such that ei1 vi1
vi1 , . . . , eik vik vik . Note furthermore that piB ∩ piC = pi(B × C).
We conclude that ♦6A∩piB ∩piC 6= ∅ if and only if ♦6A∩piB 6= ∅ and ♦6A∩piC 6=
∅. This proves the indicated statement; the version with “♦>” replacing “♦6” is seen
similarly.
(vii) The assertion is trivial if B = ∅. Otherwise, piA∩♦6B = ∅ iff a ∈ A implies that
a >i b for all b ∈ B. The first part follows; the second one is seen analogously.
Note that, as in the case of LAEC, in the present case of LAEPCwe will have the axiom
(A19) that will allow us to combine conclusions in a conjunctive way. Its soundness is
due to the following lemma.
Here, by an orthotope we mean a Cartesian product of intervals. Note that, for any
non-empty subset A of W , ♦6A ∩ ♦>A is the smallest orthotope containing A.
Lemma 4.4. Let (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) be a component-wise ordered similarity space.
Let A,B ⊆W be orthotopes with a non-empty intersection and let c ∈ V . Then
Uc(A ∩B) = Uc(A) ∩ Uc(B).
Proof. This is an easy consequence of Lemma 3.3.
We proceed by proposing an axiomatisation of LAEPC.
Definition 4.5. The axioms of LAEPC are the following ones, for any basic expressions
of LAEPC ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ B and any c, d ∈ V :
axioms (A1’) and (A2)–(A11);
axioms (A12)–(A14), (A17), (A19);
axiom (A15), where ϕ and ψ belong to one coinciding sort;
axiom (A16), where ε is a one-sorted m.e.c.;
axiom (A18), where ϕ is one-sorted;
as well as
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Figure 5: Illustration of Lemma 4.4.
(A20) ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕ′ >1 ⊥) → ((ϕ >c ψ) ∧ (ϕ′ >c ψ′)↔ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′ >c ψ ∧ ψ′)),
where ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ′ ∧ ψ′ are disjoint-sorted
(A21) ((♦>ϕ) ∧ χ ∧ ψ >1 ⊥) → ((♦>ϕ) ∧ χ >1 ⊥) ∨ ((♦>ϕ) ∧ ψ >1 ⊥) and
((♦6ϕ) ∧ χ ∧ ψ >1 ⊥)→ ((♦6ϕ) ∧ χ >1 ⊥) ∨ ((♦6ϕ) ∧ ψ >1 ⊥),
where χ and ψ are disjoint-sorted
(A22) (ε >1 α) ∨ (ε >1 ¬α),
where ε is a m.e.c.
Moreover, the only rule of LAEPC is (MP).
Theorem 4.6. Let T be a theory and Φ be a formula of LAEPC. Then T `LAEPC Φ if
and only if T |=LAEPC Φ.
Proof. We check again the “only if” part first. The soundness of (A1)–(A10) follows
from the soundness part of Theorem 2.4. The soundness of (A15)–(A16) follows from
part (i) of Definition 4.2 and the soundness part of Theorem 3.7. Moreover, the sound-
ness of (A22) follows from part (ii) of Definition 4.2.
The soundness of (A12), (A13), (A14), (A17), and (A18) holds by parts (i), (ii), (iii),
(iv), and (vii) of Lemma 4.3, respectively. (A19) is sound by Lemma 4.4. Finally,
(A20) and (A21) are sound by part (v) and (vi) of Lemma 4.3, respectively.
To see the “if” part, assume that T does not prove Φ. Extending T if necessary, we can
again assume that T is complete.
On the set of basic expressions B, we define the relation 4, its symmetrisation ≈,
and the Boolean algebra L of ≈-classes like in the proof of Theorem 2.4. By (A17),
also ♦6 and ♦> are compatible with ≈ and hence induce unary operations on L. Note
furthermore that by (A22), each unsorted variable α is equivalent to a basic expression
in which only sorted variables occur.
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Let us consider a sort 1 6 i 6 M . Let Bi ⊆ B consist of all basic expressions of the
sort i. Moreover, let Li be the Boolean subalgebra of L generated by the ≈-classes of
elements of Bi. Note that all axioms of LAEC apply to Bi. Hence we can proceed like
in the proof of Theorem 3.7 to construct a totally ordered similarity space (Wi, Si,vi)
such that Wi = {〈ε〉≈ ∈ Li : ε is a m.e.c. of sort i such that T 0 ε >1 ⊥} and, for any
ϕ ∈ Bi, ♦6ϕ is the supremum of all m.e.c.s ε of sort i such that 〈ε〉≈ vi 〈δ〉≈ for some
m.e.c. δ 4 ϕ of sort i, and similarly for ♦>.
Let nowW be the set consisting of the 〈ε〉≈’s, where ε is a m.e.c. such that T 0 ε >1 ⊥.
Let 〈εi〉≈ ∈ Wi for i = 1, . . . ,M ; then T 0 εi >1 ⊥ for any i and it follows from
(A21) that T 0 ∧i εi >1 ⊥ and consequently 〈∧i εi〉≈ ∈W . We conclude thatW can
be identified with the direct product of the Wi’s. Under this identification, we extend
vi to a preorder 6i on W according to (8).
For 〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈ ∈ W , we define S(〈δ〉≈, 〈ε〉≈) by (3). By (A20), we conclude that S
depends on the Si according to (7). Hence (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ) is a component-wise
ordered similarity space.
By (A14), we have ♦6〈⊥〉≈ = ♦>〈⊥〉≈ = 〈⊥〉≈. Our next aim is to show that, for any
〈ϕ〉≈ ∈ L\{〈⊥〉≈},
♦6〈ϕ〉≈ =
∧
{♦6〈ε〉≈ : ε is a one-sorted m.e.c. such that ϕ 4 ♦6ε},
♦>〈ϕ〉≈ =
∧
{♦>〈ε〉≈ : ε is a one-sorted m.e.c. such that ϕ 4 ♦>ε}.
(12)
It will then follow that ♦6 and ♦> are defined on L in accordance with (10).
We restrict to the first part of (12); the second part is shown analogously. The “4”
relation follows from (A17a), (A13a), and (A19). To see the “<” relation, let δ be a
m.e.c. such that δ ∧ ♦6ϕ ≈ ⊥. Let δ ≈ ε1 ∧ . . . ∧ εM , where εi is, for each i, a one-
sorted m.e.c. belonging to the sort i. By (A21), there is an i such that εi ∧ ♦6ϕ ≈ ⊥.
By (A18), it further follows ♦>εi ∧ ♦6ϕ ≈ ⊥. Hence ϕ 4 ♦6ϕ 4 ¬♦>εi ≈ ♦6ε′i,
where ε′i is the predecessor of εi w.r.t. vi. Moreover, δ ∧ ♦6ε′i 4 εi ∧ ♦6ε′i ≈ ⊥, and
the claim follows.
In particular,W is the set of atoms of L. We conclude that the mapping e : B → P(W )
defined by (2), that is,
e(ϕ) = {〈ε〉≈ ∈W : T ` ε >1 ϕ},
is an evaluation in (W,S, (6i)i=1,...,M ). We argue as in the proof of Theorem 2.4 to
see that (4) holds. Hence the evaluation e satisfies all elements of T but not Φ.
The system LAEPC is thus an advanced variant of the original logic LAEC that, in a
scenario with different sorts (or attributes) and a global similarity relation built from
individual ones on each sort, is able to cope with a restricted conjunctive inference
pattern.
At this point it is interesting to go back to the example introduced in Section 1. Re-
member we had three propositions α, β, γ denoting the following properties of a car:
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α “power(car) = 110 CV”
β “price(car) > 20 000 AC”
γ “consumption(car) > 6 L/100km”
and that our domain knowledge was modelled by a theory T containing the graded im-
plications α >c β, α >d γ. Requiring in addition that neither β nor γ is contradictory,
let our theory be such that
T ⊇ {α >c β, α >d γ, ¬(β >1 ⊥), ¬(γ >1 ⊥)}.
Further assume, as suggested already in Section 1, that β and γ belong to different
sorts (power and price, respectively) and that α is unsorted. Moreover, as the intended
semantics of β and γ is to denote upwards closed intervals in the range of prices and
consumption, we can assume that they are of the form ♦>β′ and ♦>γ′, respectively.
By (A21), LAEPC proves from T that ¬(β ∧ γ >1 ⊥) and hence we can apply (A19).
Thus LAEPC allows us to approximately conclude from T to the degree min(c, d) that
if the power of a car is 110 CV then its price is above 20 000 AC and its consumption
will be at least 6 litres per 100 km, that is,
T `LAEPC α >min(c,d) β ∧ γ.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have been concerned with extending the logic LAE, a logic for rea-
soning about graded similarity-based approximate conditionals ϕ >c ψ, to allow for a
conjunctive closure of the conclusions of these conditionals, a feature that is lacking in
its original formulation. The semantics of these logical systems is based on Kripke-like
structures, that we have called similarity spaces, consisting of a set of worlds equipped
with a fuzzy similarity relation. For our purposes, we have considered two particular
classes of these structures. In a first step, we have considered similarity spaces where
the set of worlds is endowed with a total order and the similarity relation is compatible
with it. Under these assumptions we have shown that, in the resulting logic LAEC, one
can derive the conditional α >c β ∧ γ from α >c β and α >c γ, as soon as β and γ
are non-contradictory propositions interpreted as intervals in the chain of worlds. The
possibility to refer to intervals can be achieved by means of introducing two modal op-
erators ♦6 and ♦> into the basic language, whose semantics is given by the total order
in our enriched similarity spaces taken as an accessibility relation. Then, in a sec-
ond step, we have generalised this approach to axiomatise a many-sorted logic LAEPC
whose corresponding classes of fuzzy similarity structures are Cartesian products of
totally ordered similarity spaces, each one for a different sort of the language. In this
case , the operators ♦6 and ♦> are able to capture properties of Cartesian products of
intervals.
A number of open issues remain to be addressed in future developments. For instance,
even if the logic LAEPC already has a much better expressive power than the original
LAEC, it would certainly be desirable to have a logic without the technical constraints
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that we introduced to validate the conjunctive combination of conclusions in graded
implications. Another interesting extension to study is to allow for a more general
language, already starting with LAE, where the >c operators can be nested. Indeed,
one could express the operator >c in terms of a graded possibility KTB-modality
♦c (like in [10]) together with a global S5 necessity modality , namely to express
ϕ >c ψ as (ϕ → ♦cψ).3 Yet another alternative approach to explore is to introduce
a notion of context into these graded implications, where contexts basically encode
subsets of possible worlds that enforce the validity of the graded implications that they
are qualifying. This approach was already considered in [9] in the setting of graded
consequence relations. A further important question to be addressed is the complexity
of these logics and efficient proof methods for them; cf. [1, 2].
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